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STATUTORY INHIBITIONS UPON UNFAIR USE OF
CORPORATE INFORMATION BY INSIDERS
By ROBERT S. RUBIN t and MYER FELDMAN 1
INTRODUCTION
It has been over twelve years since the enactment of Section 16
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 1 which was designed to pre-
vent the unfair use of inside information by corporate executives and
principal stockholders. This was to be accomplished by taking the
profit out of short-term insider securities trading, and by giving pub-
licity to insider trading whether short or long term. The provisions
of this section, together with Section 9, the anti-manipulation section
of the Act, 2 are among the most significant provisions contained in
the federal securities laws.3 Prior to the enactment of Section 16
speculation on inside information was. probably one of the largest
sources of income to management and other insiders. The invidious
character of such trading is emphasized by the fact that the profit so
obtained by the managers was not disclosed to the real owners of the
corporation, to wit, the stockholders, and because it was often obtained
at their expense.
The recent increase in the volume of trading and corporate
financings has heightened public interest in the efficacy of the statutory
provisions related to transactions by insiders. Accordingly, re-
examination of Section 16 and cognate provisions of law in the light
of experience over the past twelve years seems particularly appropriate.
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The views of the writers expressed herein are not necessarily to be construed as
those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or any other member of its Staff.
I. 48 STAT. 84 (I933), 15 U. S. C. §77P (1940).
2. § 9, 48 STAT. 8O (1933), I5 U. S. C. § 77i (1940).
3. § 17 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 serves a similar pur-
pose with respect to securities of utility holding companies and their subsidiaries.
§ 30 (f) of the Investment Company Act of i94O makes the provisions of § 16 appli-
cable to closed end investment trusts. § 1O (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rule X-ioB-5 thereunder serves in a more limited way as a means for com-
pelling disgorgement of profits made by insiders from trading with stockholders of
their own companies, see infra p. 497. See also § 249 of the Bankruptcy Act which de-
prives fiduciaries in corporate reorganizations from any compensation if they trade in
the securities of a debtor during the pendency of the proceedings. Cf. In re Midland
United Corporation, - F. (2d) - (C. C. A. 3d, 1947), where it was held that this lat-
ter section includes trading in such securities by the wife of the fiduciary.
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Contrary to the general impression, apart from the utility field, the
financial affairs of the sizable publicly owned companies are largely
unregulated, leaving the absentee owner-stockholders largely unpro-
tected except to the extent that the corporate managers voluntarily
abide by their fiduciary obligations. A measure of protection is
afforded absentee owners by the disclostire and reporting requirements
of the Securities Act of 1933 4 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.' However, in view of the wide area of unregulated activity on
the part of corporate insiders and the general tendency of the courts
to refrain from interference in corporate operations, increased im-
portance is assignable to such provisions as Section 16 of the Securities
Exchange Act, which supply minimum sanctions against the breaching
of the seams of the fiduciary garments in which corporate management
are clothed by law.
Extremely valuable tidbits of corporate information offer com-
pelling temptations to misuse by those who have access to them. In
addition, although various provisions of the Securities Exchange Act
furnished the investor with information on which could be predicated
an informed judgment of values, it was necessary that insiders be pre-
vented from taking advantage of advance information concerning the
disclosures so that the information received by the invester would not
be made useless to him. Accordingly, Congress padlocked this par-
ticular corporate cupboard by taking the profit out of short-term
speculative trading by insiders in the securities of their own com-
panies.6  The basic purpose of this article is to examine and review
the effect of this prescription.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 had as its guiding light
the overriding public interest in freeing the securities markets from
all artificial influences so that they might reflect true values, and also
to curb abuses by insiders who normally have access to confidential
information not available to small stockholders and to the general
public. In addition to removing the profit motive from short term
insider trading, exchange practices were regulated,7 manipulative and
deceptive devices were outlawed, s and the extension of credit was
supervised.f The Act was broadly designed to stabilize the national
4. SECURITIES AcT OF 1933, §§ 5, 8, I0, 48 STAT. 77, 79, 81, 15 U. S. C. §§ 77e, 77h,
77J (I94O).
5. SECURITIES EXCHANGE AcT OF 1934, H 12, 13, 14 and 16, 48 STAT. 892, 894,
896, 15 U. S. C. §§ 781, 78m, 78n, 78 p (940).
6. It should be notea that § 16 liability is imposed only upon dealings in "equity
securities" (defined in § 3 (a) (ii)) of companies which have at least one class of such
equity securities registered on a national securities exchange.
7. §§6, 19, 48 STAT. 78, 85 (934), 15 U. S. C. §§ 77f, 77s (1940).
8. §§9, 10, 15, 48 STAT. 8o, 81, 84 (1934), 15 U. S. C. §§77i, 77j, 770 (1940).
9. §§7, 8, 48 STAT. 78, 79 (1934), 15 U. S. C. §§77g, 77h (1940).
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economy against the shocks produced by a faulty investment system
which had not adjusted itself to modern conditions. At the heart of the
problem was the development of large corporations whose management
was not as responsive to the ethical and legal sanctions present in
earlier years when the companies were smaller, more localized and less
widely owned.'
If officers, directors and controlling stockholders were permitted
to purchase an'd sell stock in their enterprises and to profit from
short swing increases or decreases in the price of the securities, there
would be a strong temptation to withhold important information until
management had been afforded an adequate opportunity to profit
thereby.
In an effort to do away with these abuses Section i6 was enacted.
In general, subsection (a) requires every person who is the bene-
ficial owner of more than io per cent of any class of equity security 11
which is registered on a national securities exchange or who is a
director or officer of the issuer of such security 12 to file with the
Commission and with the securities exchange a statement of ownership
which indicates the amount of equity securities held and to report
changes in that amount. In the only case in which the Commission
has brought an injunctive action because of failure to comply with
this reporting provision a consent decree was obtained.13
Subsection (b) provides in general, that all profits which accrue
to such officer, director or beneficial owner of an issuer which has
any equity security so registered on an exchange, from trading in any
equity security of such issuer within a 6 months period shall inure
to and be recoverable by the issuer, and authorizes suit in its behalf
by any security holder upon failure or refusal of the issuer to institute
the action. Specifically exempted are (i) transactions where the bene-
io. See BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORAION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932); T. N. E. C. MONOGRAPH NO. 29, THE DISTRIBUTION OF OWNERSHIP IN THE
200 LARGEST NON-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1940); T. N. E. C. MONOGRAPH No.
ii, BUREAUCRACY AND TRUSTEESHIP IN LARGE CORPbRATIONS (1940); TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND, INC., BIG BUSINESS: ITS GROWTH AND ITS PLACE (1937).
II. "Equity Security" is defined by § 3 (a) (II) of the Securities Exchange Act
as follows:
"The term 'equity security' means any stock or similar security; or any secu-
rity convertible, with or without consideration, into such a security, or carrying
any warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase such a security; or any such
warrant or right; or any other security which the Commission shall deem to be
of similar nature and consider necessary or appropriate, by such rules and regula-
tions as it may prescribe in the public interest or for the protection of investors,
to treat as an equity security."
12. § 17 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 differs from § 16 of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in that its application is restricted to officers and
directors of registered holding companies.
13. Securities and Exchange Commission v. L. A. Young, Civil Action No. 4154
(E. D. Mich. 1945).
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ficial owner 14 was not such both at the time of purchase and the time
of sale, (2) acquisitions of securities in good faith in connection with
a debt previously contracted, and (3) such transactions as the Com-
mission may, by rule or regulation, exempt as not comprehended within
the purpose of the section.
Subsection (c), generally speaking, makes it unlawful for in-
siders either to sell their securities short or to engage in the practice
of "selling against the box," a system whereby the owner of securities
sells and then borrows securities from someone else to meet his com-
mitment, hoping to purchase the securities later for delivery to his
creditor at a lower price.15 This subsection may be enforced either
by a criminal proceeding under Section 32 (a) of the Act 1 6 where the
violation is "wilful," or by an injunctive action by the Commission
under Section 21 (e) of the Act,17 or by administrative action when
a registered broker or dealer, or a member of a stock exchange has
committed or participated in the violation.ls
Subsection (d) gives the Commission the authority to exempt
foreign and domestic arbitrage transactions from the purview of Sec-
tion 16. However, the Commission has adopted a rule which has
the effect of bringing such transactions by directors or officers, as dis-
tinguished from beneficial owners, within the provisions of Sections
16 (a) and (b). 19
It is apparent that the provisions of Section 16 (b) impose upon
insiders a liability beyond and in addition to that which exists under
the common law. 20 Apart from cases of misrepresentation, liability
at common law was grounded upon the existence of a relationship
between the buyer and the seller which conferred upon one of the
parties special duties of disclosure. It did not adequately reach the
subtleties of harm in connection with manipulation on the impersonal
14. This exemption does not apply, it should be noted, to officers and directors.
15. This section is framed in terms of the failure to deliver the owner's security
within a specified period.
16. 48 STAT. 904 (I934), 15 U. S. C. §78ff (a) (1940).
17. 48 STAT. 99 (934), 15 U. S. C. § 78u (e) (194o).
18. §§15 (b), ig (a) (3), 48 STAT. 895, 898 (I934), 15 U. S. C. §§780 (b), 78s
(a) (3) (1940).
ig. Rule X-I6D-i.
20. Prior to the passage of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 there was con-
flict of opinion among the courts over the liability which an insider who traded in the
securities of his corporation assumed. The majority of the state courts held that in-
siders were under no obligation so long as they did not actively mislead or falsify; the
federal courts held that an obligation existed only when "special circumstances" were
present which implied a duty of disclosure; and a small minority of the state courts
held that an officer or director possessed a fiduciary responsibility toward the share-
holders as well as toward the corporation, which was violated whenever he made a
profit in transactions with them as a result of information which was acquired by rea-
son of his position. See Yourd, Trading in Securities by Directors, Officers and Stock-
holders; Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act (1939) 38 MIcH. L. REv. 133,
139-152.
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securities markets. The damages, if recoverable at common law, were
payable to the plaintiff security holder who was defrauded. In con-
trast, Section 16 (b) requires any money award to be paid to the
corporate treasury. It would seem that the common law remedy is
still available to a security holder who can sustain the burden of proof
required under the applicable state law.2
Perhaps the most important difference, however, lies in the rule
of thumb adopted by the Act to discourage insider trading by requiring
that all profits therefrom inure to the company. The statute does not
require a finding that the trading was* actually ,based upon secret un-
disclosed information or that an overall profit on all transactions was
realized by the insider. Any profit realized from any single pair of
non-exempt 22 transactions which occur within any six months period
inures to the corporation,
PARTIES AND LIMITATIONS
The statute contemplates in the normal case an action instituted
by the corporation. Since the defendant in such litigation is either
a director, an officer, or an influential stockholder of the plaintiff, the
defendant may be in a position to dominate the plaintiff corporation.
This may result in the failure of the corporation to institute an action.
In that event the provision of the statute permitting any stockholder
to sue will then become operative. Moreover, in those instances in
which the corporation does institute the action, even though it prose-
cutes diligently, there is danger that conflicting loyalties will affect the
conduct of the litigation. To guard against such a result as noted, it
has been held that any stockholder should have the right to intervene
and represent an adversary interest when it appears that there is a
community of interest between the parties to such litigation.23  Par-
ticipation as amicus curiae is inadequate for it is essential that the
stockholder be permitted to produce evidence at trial, cross examine wit-
nesses, participate in examination before trial and at pre-trial confer-
ences, file appeals from rulings of the trial court, and do all the other
things that would ensure a full'inquiry. Accordingly, it was held that
intervention was warranted in accordance with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 24  Whether the corporation or the minority stock-
21. § 28 (a)- of the Act specifically'preserves the legal and equitable rights which
existed prior to the passage of the Act.
22. The burden of proof rests upon the person claiming the exemption. Cf. Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission v. Sunbeam Gold Mines Co., 95 F. (2d) 699 (C. C. A.
9th, 1938); Edwards v. United States, 113 F. (2d) 286, 289 (C. C. A. Ioth, 1940),
rev'd on other grounds, 312 U. S. 473 (although-sustained on this point, at p. 483).
23. Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, - F. (2d) - (C. C. A. 2d, 1947).
24. Ibid. Rule 24 (a) (2) provides that anyone shall be permitted to intervene
whenever representation of the applicant's interest "may be inadequate." In a suit under
§ 16 (b), instituted by the corporation it should not be necessary to prove definitive in-
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holder institutes the action the cburt should jealously guard the char-
acter of the litigation by broadly construing the right of the minority
security holder to participate.
23
While there is a superficial similarity between Section 16 (b)
suits and the ordinary stockholders' derivative actions, it is indicated
clearly on the face of Section 16 (b) that it has a broader reach than
such derivative suits in a number of important respects. Its funda-
mental purpose, moreover, is to make disgorging of insiders' profits
almost automatic. Hence, those limitations that have been developed
in respect to derivative suits, because many of them have been found
to be unmeritorious, ought not to apply in the present context. Ac-
cordingly, in considering whether security holders who have become
such after the transactions which form the basis for the action should
be permitted to participate in or to initiate the proceedings, rules
governing stockholders' derivative suits may not be helpful. The
statute furnishes no explicit guide to the solution of this question but
when the purpose of the Act, to deter insiders from short-term trading
in their corporation's securities by causing any profits therefrom to
inure to the corporation, is considered, it would seem that the right to
prosecute a- 16 (b) action should not be dependent upon the acquisition
of the securities at a particular time.
In the ordinary stockholders' derivative action, there is a conflict
of authority as to whether such actions may be commenced by stock-
holders who acquired their interest after the date when the cause of
action arose. Rule 23 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
requires the plaintiff to be a shareholder at the time of the transaction
of which he complains or to have received his shares by operation of
law. On the other hand, some state courts have reasoned that since
the proceeds of a successful action would benefit both stockholders who
acquired their interest prior to the transaction complained of and
those who became stockholders after that transaction any stockholder
should be permitted to sue to protect his interest. There are com-
pelling reasons for adopting the latter point of view in Section 16 (b)
litigation.
26
In the first place, the security holder plaintiff 27 in a Section
16 (b) action, in addition to seeking recovery for the benefit of all
adequacy. The dangers inherent in the situation call for the adoption of a rule' of thumb
which permits intervention whenever it appears there is a community of interest be-
tween the parties.
25. It has been the policy of the Commission to limit its appearance to that of
amicus curiae and not to participate in any of the factual issues..6. For a discussion of this problem in relation to shareholders' representative suits
see Frey, Noteworthy Decisions in the Law of Private Corporations: 194o-1945 (1946)
94 U. OF PA. L. REv. 265.
27. Any security holder, regardless of whether he is the owner of an equity secu-
rity or whether the security he owns is listed on an exchange may institute the action.
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present security holders as in the ordinary derivative suit, acts as an
instrument of a statutory policy against short-term insider trading.
As such, a defense addressed to the fact that he may have purchased
his securities to qualify as a party to the action and is not aggrieved
should be unavailable. A Section i6 (b) suit differs from a stock-
holder's derivative action in that it is founded upon a specific statute
enacted to remedy an existing evil. Secondly, this statute grants the
broad right to institute the action to "the owner of any security of
the issuer" without any limitations upon the time when that security
was acquired. To require the security holders to be such at some time
prior to the trading activities in question would be incorporating a
requirement into the Act not reasonably suggested by its words or
purpose.
Before the action may be commenced by a person other than the
corporation it is necessary that a request be made of the corporation
and that it be given sixty days in which to comply with the request
and in the ordinary case this opportunity should be accorded it. How-
ever, the situation may arise in which, if the cause of action is to be
preserved, it will not be possible to wait the full sixty days. A statute
of limitations of only twQ years is provided by Section i6 (b), and,
generally, if the action is not instituted within that time it will be lost.
The short statute of limitations prescribed by Section I6 (b)
presents a problem when an insider, either wilfully or negligently, fails
to file the reports required by Section i6 (a) until more than two
years after his trades occurred. A literal reading of the Act would
seem to absolve him from liability for it provides that "no . . . suit
shall be brought more than two years aifter the date such profit was
realized." 28 This language, however, must be read in the light of
the purpose of Section i6 (b) and the decisions construing comparable
federal statutes.
The Securities Exchange Act establishes three sanctions for en-
forcement of those provisions relating to the prohibition upon insider
trading. (i) Section 16 (a) sets forth certain reporting requirements
designed to provide publicity for such transactions. (2) Section I6 (b)
provides for the recapture of any short-term profits at the suit of the
corporation or a security holder acting in its behalf. (3) Section
I6 (c) makes certain types of such transactions unlawful, so that civil
remedies and criminal penalties may be invoked by the Commission.
These three sanctions are integral parts of a statutory scheme designed
to prevent any insider from taking advantage of facts unknown to the
investors in the corporate enterprise. Thus, Section i6 (a) is aimed
28. § i6 (b), 48 STAT. 896, I5 U. S. C. § 78 p (ig4o).
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at providing the information which must form the basis for any action
taken under the other subdivisions of Section 16. Failure to comply
with 16 (a) will necessarily hamper the enforcement of i6 (b) and
i6 (c). It appears, therefore, that if the full purpose of Congress is to
be accomplished the limitations period prescribed in Section i6 (b)
should not start with the date the profit is realized unless the disclosure
required by Section i6 (a) is made.29 Support for this view in the case
of suit by a stockholder under Section I6. (b) may be derived from the
recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Holmberg v.
Armbrecht.30 In the Holmberg case a derivative suit was instituted in
New York in behalf of the Southern Minnesota Joint Stock Land Bank
of Minneapolis to enforce a liability imposed upon shareholders of the
bank by the Federal Farm Loan Act. Although the applicable state
statutory period of limitations had elapsed since the cause of action
arose, it was alleged that the action was not barred because the fraud
of defendant in concealing his identity during that time had delayed
the discovery of the cause of action. The suit was resisted on the
ground that the Supreme Court decision in Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York 31 required the New York statute of' limitations to be applied.
In holding the Guaranty Trust case inapplicable the Court said:
"This equitable doctrine is read into every federal statute of
limitation. If the Federal Farm Loan Act had an explicit statute
of limitation for bringing suit under § I6, the time would not
have begun to run until after petitioners had discovered, or had
failed in reasonable diligence to discover, the alleged deception
• which is the basis of this suit." 32
Under rules set forth in this decision, therefore, the federal
equitable doctrine should be read into the explicit statute of limitations
provided in Section 16 (b) and the time would not begin to run until
plaintiffs in a Section 16 (b) action have discovered or with reasonable
diligence should have discovered the transactions which form the basis
for the action. An insider who, by failing to file the reports required
of him by Section I6 (a) or by other means deceives the corporation
and its stockholders; may not set up his deception as a defense against
a suit based upon one of the other subdivisions of Section I6.3 3  Full
application of the Holmberg decision seems appropriate, since the short
statute of limitations would seem to have been adopted because it ap-
29. Cf. Bigelow v. R. K. 0. Pictures, Inc., 327 U. S. 251 (1946).
30. 327 U. S. 392 (1946).
31. 326 U. S. 99 (1945).
32. Cited supra note 3o.
33. Nor would it appear material whether the failure to comply with the Act was
wilful.
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peared that by virtue of Section 16 (a) there would be a prompt
disclosure to all security holders of trading in the c6rporate stock.
ENFORCEMENT
(a) Jurisdiction and Venue
Actions filed pursuant to Section 16 (b) "may be instituted at
law or in equity," under the terms of that Section, "in any court of
competent jurisdiction." Without further examination of the statute
it would seem that suit may be instituted in any court with jurisdiction
over suits at law or equity for the recovery of monies. However, sec-
tion 27, which sets forth the jurisdictional requirements for the Act as
a whole, specifies that:
"The district courts of the United States, the Supreme Court
of the District of Columbia, and the United States courts of any
Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of this title
or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity
and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created
by this title or the rules and regulations thereunder . . .1 4
(Emphasis supplied.)
Were it not for Section 27 the jurisdictional provision of Section 16 (b)
would appear to give state courts the power to entertain 16 (b) actions.
But Section 27 makes it clear that only federal courts may entertain
such actions.
In the only decision upon this question the New York Court of
Appeals held that a Section 16 (b) suit could not ,be maintained in
the New York state courts because of the positive language of Section
27 conferring exclusive jurisdiction under the Act upon the federal
courts. The phrase "any court of competent jurisdiction" in Section
16 (b), it was held, referred to courts in the federal system only. 5
Moreover, the statute makes it clear that Section 27 applies to suits
under Section 16 (b), and is not limited to suits brought by the Com-
mission, as has been contended. The express provisions of Section 27
refer to "all suits" to enforce any liability or duty created by the Act. 6
Assuming, then, that only federal courts may entertain 16 (b)
actions, it becomes pertinent to inquire which federal courts are "com-
34. 48 STAT. 902 (1934), 15 U. S. C. §78aa (1940).
35. American Distilling Co. v. Brown, 295 N. Y. 36 (1945).
36. Cf. Kardon'v. National Gypsum Co., - F. Supp. - (E. D. Pa. 1946) ; Fifth-
Third Union Trust Co. v. Block, Civil Action No. 1507 (Unreported, S. D. Ohio
1946) ; Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 6564 (Unreported, E. D.
Pa. 1946).
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petent" within the meaning of Section I6. -It is clearly stated that
venue'may be established where the defendant is found, where the de-
fendant is an inhabitant, or where the defendant transacts business.37
It is not quite so clear whether the action may be instituted in the
place where the exchange involved is located or where the transaction
in question occurred.
The original drafts of the Act provided for venue in both civil
and criminal proceedings in the district "wherein the exchange in-
volved is operated," 38 in addition to the language which survived in
the Act in its final form. These additional words were dropped in
the bill as reported out by both Committees without indication of any
reason for doing so. It would seem that they were dropped as sur-
plusage, for when Section 27 says "Any suit or action to enforce any
liability or duty created by this title . . . may be brought in any
such district . . ." it refers to the preceding sentence, which permits
criminal proceedings to be instituted "in the district wherein any act
or transaction constituting the violation occurred." Since the pur-
chase and sales are the transactions which give rise to the 16 (b) lia-
bility the action may be instituted in any place where these purchases
and sales take place. Thus, the Act as finally passed includes, as an
alternative venue, the place where the exchange involved is located, if
the transaction creating the liability is executed thereon, or where the
transactions in question occurred.
It should be noted that in using the phrase "such district" Section
27 refers back to "the district wherein any act or transaction consti-
tuting the violation occurred." One seeking to avoid suit in the place
where the trading occurred would argue that the latter phrase refers
only to acts made unlawful by the Securities Exchange Act. Only
those acts, it would be contended, are "violations"; therefore, the
phrase "such district" has reference only to suits instituted under
sections of the Act which make actions "unlawful."
This argument is based upon the assumption that civil actions
brought in "such district" must be based upon "violations" and that
"violations" refer only to breaches of the criminal law. If the latter
argument were adopted it would become necessary to prove certain
acts criminal in character in order to sustain the venue in a civil suit.
Thus, Section i8 (a) provides for civil actions for damages resulting
from certain false and misleading statements and makes such state-
ments actionable, whether or not also subject to the criminal sanctions
37. Query whether the defendant transacts business in the district where the pur-
chase or sale of securities takes place. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo
Materials Co., 273 U. S. 359 (1927).
31. SEx. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) ; H. R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
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of Section 32 (a) because "wilfully and knowingly" made. It would
become necessary to prove the wilfulness of the false statement to avoid
dismissal for improper venue. Thus, the venue would be dependent
upon the proof of the criminal character of the act while the basic
issue of civil liability would not require such proof. Congress can
hardly have intended such a result.
It is likewise apparent from the context in which the words "such
district" appears in the venue portion of Section 27 of the Act that
the district referred to was intended to be an available forum for both
suits to enjoin violations and suits to enforce liabilities. To the extent,
therefbre, that violations are not a prerequisite to civil liability, it
could not have been intended that the acts which fix venue within a
particular district must amount to a "violation" even in the civil sense.
Furthermore, although short-term trading by owners, directors,
and officers in the securities of their corporation is not made a "viola-
tion" of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in the sense of an act
prohibited, Section 16 expressly embodies the strict statutory policy
against such conduct on the part of corporate insiders. Thus, the
statute provides that it is: "For the purpose of preventing the unfair
use of information by [insiders]." Plainly, the statute seeks to put
a stop to such trading, and enforces its policy by removing all oppor-
tunity to profit thereby. Accordingly, if it is necessary to have a
"violation" as a basis for liability, it is probable that what was intended
is the violation of the statutory policy against short term insider
trading.39 This policy was expressed in the case of Smolowe v.
Delendo Corp.40 as the establishment of "a standard so high as to pre-
vent any conflict between the selfish interest of a fiduciary officer,
director, or stockholder and the faithful performance of his duty."
Short-term trading by insiders, the court said, was "within the general
scope of the legislature's intended prohibition." 41
It is important to provide a wide choice of venue for 16 (b)
actions in order that the shareholder may not be handicapped in his
attempt to enforce the liability created by that section. Without venue
in the place where the transaction occurred an insider might effectively
insulate himself from liability by maintaining his residence and place
of business in a state or foreign country distantly removed from the
39. In Baird v. Franklin, 141 F. (2d) 238 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944) suit was instituted
against the New York Stock Exchange for its failure to take disciplinary action
against a member under rules which it had adopted as required by § 6 (b) of the
Securities Exchange Act. This failure was held (per Clark, J.) to be a "violation"
of § 6 (b), although that section did not make anything "unlawful." In Goldstein v.
Groesbeck, 142 F. (2d) 422 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944) the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit defined "act or transaction constituting the violation" as "any breach
of duty causing injury or loss to private persons." Id. at 425.
40. 136 F. (2d) 231, 239 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
41. Id. at 237.
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residence of the shareholders and the corporation. This would place
a difficult burden upon the person instituting the action. Since in
many cases it would be a shareholder, and not the corporation, which
commenced the proceedings, the burden would usually have to be
borne by a person unable to bear it from the financial and practical
standpoint.
On the other hand, a holding which permitted suit to be instituted
where the transactions took place would frequently result in permitting
the venue to be laid where the exchange is located, and consequently
within the general area in which many of the stockholders are resident
or doing business. If the insider trades in any given place, he cannot
with grace complain because he may be sued there.
42
Service of process under the specific language of Section 27 does
not have to be made in the district in which suit is begun. Service
of process may be effected by the local marshal at the place where the
insider is an inhabitant or is found.
43
No court as yet has had presented to it the problem of venue
when some, but not all, of the transactions which form the basis for
the 16 (b) action take place within a particular district. It would
be manifestly improper to divide the cause of action so that the suit is
limited to the recovery of profits which result solely from the sales and
purchases within that district. Nor would it be consonant with the
intent of Congress to deprive a shareholder of the right to bring the
action at the place where the transaction occurred because other transac-
tions giving rise to a similar liability occurred elsewhere. The only
way in which the intent of Congress to provide for a wide choice of
venue could be accomplished is by construing the Act to mean that
suit may be instituted wherever any transaction giving rise to the
violation occurred and by permitting the joinder of causes of action
arising in other districts in the interest of an efficient prosecution of
the claim.
(b) Attorneys' Fees
Whether the action is instituted by the corporation or by the
security holder the Act provides that the profits shall "inure to and
be recoverable by the issuer." 44 The judgment secured, therefore, will
be payable to the corporation. Thus, where it is necessary for the
security holder to institute the action his gain will be limited to his
42. One of the tests for listing on an average is distribution within the vicinity of
the exchange.
43. § 27 provides that "process . . . may be served in any other district of which
the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found." Similar lan-
guage in the Securities Act of 1933 was construed in Cohen v. Saddlemire, 26 F. Supp.
27 (D. Mass. 1939).
44. § 16 (b), 48 STAT. 896 (1934), 15 U. S. C. §78p (1940).
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pro rata interest in the corporation. In most instances this would be
a trifling amount which would not even defray the cost of suit and
counsel fees.
In recognition of this practical problem it would seem clearly
desirable to encourage proper litigation by awarding the attorney for a
successful plaintiff in a Section 16 (b) action reasonable counsel fees. 4-
The whole problem of the enforcement of actions designed to
prevent insiders from profiting from trading in securities of their own
corporations is likely to meet the same objections which have been
urged against the so-called "striker's suits." In the reward which is
offered in the way of fees for the successful prosecution of such cases
it is urged that litigation is encouraged upon the slightest pretext. The
accusation that these derivative suits are therefore champertous has
led many states to restrict the right of stockholders to bring such ac-
tions by imposing conditions regarding the financial responsibility of
the real party plaintiff.46  Similar restrictions would be undesirable
in Section 16 (b) actions, for the action is based upon a clear statutory
right to the recovery which is designed to promote aggressive enforce-
ment of the effort to curb short-term insider trading. Unlike the
ordinary derivative stockholders' suits, the action under Section 16 (b)
is not fraught with doubt as to whether a cause of action exists.
Indeed, in most instances recovery is practically automatic, the basis




It may be that a Section 16 (b) suit is neither settled " by the
parties nor concluded by a judgment of the court. Instead, the litiga-
45. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F. (2d) 231, 241 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943), cert.
denied, 320 U. S. 751 (1943) commented on the award of counsel fees as follows:
"While the allowance here was quite substantial we are not disposed to interfere
with the district court's well-considered determination."
This is to be compared with the rule applicable to allowances awarded in bank-
ruptcy proceedings, whe:e it is settled that the court must guard against "vicarious
generosity" and be economical in its distributions. Levin v. Barker, 122 F. (2d) 969
(C. C. A. 8th, 1941) ; In re Standard Gas and Electric Co., io6 F. (2d) 215 (C. C. A.
d, 1939) ; Stark v. Woods Bros. Corp., lO9 F. (2d) 969 (C. C. A. 8th, 194o). See
also Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, et al., No. 57,. Oct. Term, 1946 (C. C. A. 2d,
1947).
46. See, e. g., N. J. RFy. STAT. tit. 14:3-15, CoRP. MANUAL (1946) 1316-1317;
N. Y. GEN'i. CORP. LAW § 61-5, CoRn'. MANUAL (1946) 1423; 12'PA. STAT. ANN. (Pur-
don, 1945) § 1322, CoRP'. MANUAL (1946) 1753; WIS. STAT. § 180.13 (3), added by L.
1945, c. 462, CoRnP. MANUAL (1946) 2224.
47. The statement of ownership required by § 16 (a) does not provide for a dis-
closure of either the price paid for the security or the price for which the security was
sold. However, an approximation can readily be ascertained by an examination of the
range of prices on the day the transaction occurred.
48. Settlement of § 16 (b) litigation would seem to be governed by FED. RULEs
Crv. PRoc. Rule 23 (C).
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tion may be voluntarily discontinued by the party with control over it.
Under the principles governing the right to intervene it would seem
that any security holder who might have instituted the action orig-
inally should have the right to continue the action.49 Assuming, how-
ever, that application is not seasonably made to intervene, the suit
should be permitted to be terminated.
Where a corporation dominated by an insider being sued has
instituted the i6 (b) action there would be a temptation to utilize the
device of discontinuance to avoid liability. Only by careful scrutiny
of I6 (b) actions which are discontinued and by liberal grant of per-
mission to reopen such proceedings can this danger be obviated. Even
where a minority security holder has instituted the 'action, the terms
of any discontinuance should be approved by the court. Nor does the
practice of giving notice and opportunity to intervene to all security
holders exhaust the jurisdiction of the court. Under its equitable
powers it may, even though no qualified person offered to continue
the litigation, require that any increment to a stockholder from sale
of his securities which is connected with an agreement to thereby dis-
qualify himself from continuing the action should inure to the cor-
poration.
Under this doctrine the proceeds of the sale are divisible into two
parts; that which represents the reasonable value of the securities, and
that which represents the additional sum paid in order to secure a
discontinuance of the action. For the latter amount the stockholder
is accountable as a fiduciary. This rule does not prevent discontinu-
ance of actions in the interest of a speedy termination of the litigation.
Rather, it guarantees that a security holder, once having undertaken
to guard the rights of his class by instituting or intervening in a i6 (b)
action, will be held to the same level of accountability as a security
holder acting in a representative capacity in other types of litigation.50
TRANSACTIONS AND PROFITS REACHED BY THE ACT
A share of stock is fungible, with exactly the same rights as any
other share of the same class. Accordingly, delivery of a particular
share of stock is not required under a purchase or sales contract, and
the profit realized upon a particular sale or purchase is not necessarily
attributable to the particular certificate delivered, even though it has
been carefully segregated. For tax purposes a "first in first out" rule
has been adopted under which it is presumed that the' shares first
49. See Golconda Petroleum Corp. v. Petrol Corp., 46 F. Supp. 23 (S. D. Cal.
1942).
5o. See Young v. Higbee, 324 U. S. 204 (1945) ; Clarke v. Greenberg, - N. Y.
- (1947).
482 UNIVERSITY OF, PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
purchased are first sold.51 Although this method of determining the
profit realized is consonant with the theory of the income taxing statute
it would not accomplish the objectives of Section 16 (b), which seeks
to prevent profits from insider trading.
If either the rule that the exact certificate purchased and sold
determines the profit realized or the "first in first out" theory were
adopted in Section 16 (b) situations, an easy method of evasion of the
purposes of Section 16 would be at hand. Many insiders maintain a
substantial block of their corporation's securities. By carefully trans-
ferring securities purchased more than six months before a sale or by
relying upon the securities on hand to constitute the purchase which is
to be matched against a subsequent sale, insiders could maintain their
position while trading at will, without coming within Section 16 (b).
Obviously, such trading would be a violation of the spirit and intent of
Congress, and it would lead to the abuses which Section 16 (b) was
designed to prevent.
Similarly, if an "average cost" theory, such as that applied by
the tax laws to securities acquired simultaneously in reorganizations,
were applied to Section 16 (b) trading, it would fall short of the Con-
gressional purpose. As first proposed, Section 16 (b) made short-
term trading "unlawful." This was modified because it was felt that
criminal sanctions were not necessary, except with respect to certain
types of transactions such as short sales. However, the dominant pur-
pose of the section remained to discourage- all such trading. Only
a rule which would admit of no short-term profits could accomplish
this purpose.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in the case of
Smolowe v. Delendo Corp.52 enunciated such a rule. Under this rule,
the profits are calculated in the following fashion: Listed in one column
are all the purchases made during the period for which recovery of
profits is sought. In another column is listed all of the sales during
that period. Then the shares purchased at the lowest price are matched
against an equal number of the shares sold at the highestprice within
six months of such purchase, and the profit computed. After that
the next lowest price is matched against the next highest price and
that profit is computed. Then, the same process is repeated until all
the shares in the purchase column which may be matched against
shares sold for higher prices in the sales column have been matched
off. Where necessary to accurate computation it would seem proper
to split a larger denomination or lot of shares in order to match off
51. INTERxAL REVENUE REG. III, § 29.22 (a)-8 (1943).
52. 136 F. (2d) 231 (C. C. A. 2d, i943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 751 (943).
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part of the lot against an equal amount on the other side. The gross
recovery is the sum of the profits thus determined.
This method may result in a recovery by the corporation, even
though the transactions as a whole result in a loss, for even if there
is only one purchase at a price lower than a sale within six months,
a realizable profit resultsA3 However, it is only by employing a test of
profits such as this that the public interest of investors nay be pro-
tected against actions by fiduciaries which are inconsistent with their
trust. Speculative trading by insiders is made so unattractive that the
practical consequence of the statute will be effectively to deter specu-
lative trading on inside information.
The ascertainment of profit becomes more difficult when a security
is acquired or disposed of by a method other than the simple purchase
or sale. The broad definition of "security" in Section 3 (a) (io) is
sufficiently inclusive to encompass all of the ordinary devices by which
ownership in a common enterprise is indicated.r 4  Warrants and the
right to subscribe to securities are specifically mentioned, so that traffic
in options or warrants would seem to clearly fall within the scope of
Section 16 (b). Section 3 (a) (ii) defines equity securities to in-
clude stock and any similar security, securities convertible into stock
or carrying subscription warrants or rights to stock and such warrants
or rights, and other securities treated as an equity security by the
Commission's rules.
The Act defines "purchase" to "include any contract to buy,
purchase, or otherwise acquire," 5 and the term "sale" is similarly
defined to "include any contract to sell or otherwise dispose of." 15
Two recent cases have raised the question whether the acquisition
of securities by reason of a conversion of one security into another is
within the purview of Section 16 (b). The cases arose out of similar
transactions and both held that the transactions were reached by
the statute. In one, Kogan v. Schulte,0 7 the stockholder sued in
behalf of the corporation to recover the profits and in the other, Park
& Tilford v. Schulte, et al.,5s the corporation sued in its own name,
53. In recognition of the high standard of conduct which a fiduciary must obey
a similar rule is followed, which deprives protective committees, counsel and other
fiduciaries in corporate reorganization proceedings of any fee or allowance when they
have engaged in any practice which might involve a conflict between their personal in-
terests and those of their cestuis, even where individual hardship occurs. In re Moun-
tain States Power Co., 118 F. (2d) 405, 407 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941).
54. See Securities and Exchange Commission v. W. J. Howey Co., 327 U. S. 773
(Q946) and Securities and Exchange Commission v. Joiner Corp., 320 U. S. 344 (i943),
which involved a similar definition under the Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 74
(I934), 15 U. S. C. § 77 (1940).
5s. §3 (13).
56. §3 (4).
57. 61 F. Supp. 604 (S. D. N. Y. 1945).
58. - F. (2d) - (C. C. A. 2d, 1947).
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and the stockholder was not permitted to intervene in the district court.
It is necessary for present purposes to discuss only the latter case where
the defendants were trustees of a family trust which held a controlling
interest in Park & Tilford, Inc., including both preferred and common
shares in that company. The corporation, gave notice that the pre-
ferred stock ($5o par value) was to be redeemed by the corporation
for $55.00 per share. Shortly thereafter the defendants exercised their
right to convert the preferred stock into common stock. This con-
version took place when the stipulated market price of the common
stock was approximately $58.25 per share. That was in January,
1944. Beginning late in 1943 and ending in May, 1944, there was a
spectacular rise in the market price of Park & Tilford common stock
"probably because of the rumor of an impending liquor dividend to be
paid in liquor." 51 Durig this rising market, however, a substantial
number of shares of common stock were sold by the defendant for
prices as high as $98 per share. Suit was instituted to recover the
profits realized within six months.
The defendants resisted on the ground that their action was en-
tirely involuntary, particularly because they were trustees, legally re-
quired under Ne'w York law to effect a conversion of securities where
that conversion is beneficial to the estate, upon receipt of a notice of
redemption. It was argued also that the definition of purchase did
not include acquisitions on conversion of the securities. If any pur-
chase took place, it was contended, the purchase was one which oc-
curred more than six months prior to the sale, at the time the con-
vertible preferred stock was acquired. Also urged was the claim that
the common stock received on the conversion was "acquired in good
faith in connection with a debt previously contracted" and hence within
the exception expressed in Section 16 (b).
The court held, however, that defendants' election to convert as
the more profitable alternative open to it did not make the transaction
involuntary, that the definition of "purchase" in Section 3 (a) (13)
was intended to include all acquisitions and not merely the simple and
conventional purchase transactions, and that the convertible stock could
not be considered a previously contracted debt, nor its conversion into
common as an acquisition of a security because of inability to obtain
payment otherwise of the debt. The court ordered a judgment for the
plaintiff issuer in a substantial amount.60
59. Ibid.
6o. The purchase price was considered the market value of the preferred on the
conversion date, conceded by the parties to be $364,871. The market value of the com-
mon into which it was converted was $480,853.78 on the same day. Since the proceeds
from the sale of the common was $782,999.59, damages were computed at $418,128.59.
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Questions as to whether a purchase or sale is involved arise with
respect to gifts, inheritances; redemptions: options, subscription rights,
loans, pledges, charitable contributions, installment contracts, employee
incentive plans, and bonus stock. These transactions also raise ques-
tions as to when the six months period starts, whether the purchase
and sale are of securities of the same class and what criteria should
be used in determining the purchase or sales price for the purpose of
computing profits. Many of the specific cases are not entirely free from
doubt. In general it seems clear that in determining whether the
statute applies to the particular transaction, what dates should be
taken, and what cost criteria should be chosen, the courts will resolve
the question in the way which will best effectuate the express purpose
of the statute to remove all incentive to insiders to profit from con-
fidential information available only to them because of their position
of trust.
A bona fide gift of securities would seem clearly outside the scope
of the section, as would the usual charitable contribution. However,
where the latter results in a substantial tax saving and is related to a
purchase of the same or a similar quantum of the security it would be
possible to conclude that a profit realized upon matching of the transac-
tions is recoverable if the surrounding circumstances indicate that the
transactions were susceptible to defeating the purpose of the statute.
Loans and pledges would be treated as sales, we believe, only if under
similar analysis they were found to be essentially a device to get around
the Act. Significant in that connection would be the fact that the
lender is to get a share of the profits from the transaction by the
borrower.
Most of the problems that arise are with respect to options of
one kind or another, including conversion rights. The option device
lent itself quite readily to the abuses uncovered in the Congressional
investigations antedating the Act. Moreover, the option warrant has
been since the Act a prevalent method for compensating insiders and
underwriters. The convertible security, including a convertible deben-
ture, is specifically defined as an equity security, as is the conversion
right, the subscription warrant and the stock option. In essence all
of them are options to a lesser or greater extent.
The form which the right takes varies with the purposes under-
lying its issuance and the astuteness of counsel for the management or
the bankers. The recent case of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
v. Smith 61 which held that certain types of compensatory stock options
61. 324 U. S. 177 (1945), rehearing denied, 324 U. S. 695 (1945). Petition for
rehearing pending, respecting the basis used by the Court in determining the market
value of the preferred.
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result in taxable income and the new Internal Revenue Regulation 62
which goes even further toward making profits from options taxable
income, have apparently resulted in the devising of various formulae
intended to minimize the tax consequences to the recipient of the
rights. However, the devices used create problems under Section i6
(b). For example, suppose warrants are issued to management not
for compensation, but only as an incentive. Apart from the question
as to whether it is in fact compensation, which for tax purposes ap-
pears to be largely settled in the affirmative by the new tax regulation,
such options may be construed as acquisitions of equity securities,
within the definition of "purchase" discussed above, so that a sale
of such an option within six months might result in a realized profit
under Section i6 (b). Similarly if there is a sale of a security of the
same class as that underlying the option and within six months before
or after such sale the option is exercised the latter might be considered
an acquisition matchable against the sale under Section i6 (b).
While the statute does not specifically require that the matched
transactions be of the same class, that seems to be the proper inference
from the wording of the statute, particularly in the exemptive clauses,
and also inferable from the practical difficulty of figuring profits if the
classes are clearly different. 3  However, whether the purchase and
sale are of securities of the same class is not always determinable on
a literal, narrow basis. The test should be whether the securities may
be so assimilated as to afford a means of in-and-out trading profits
derivable from use of inside information. For example, it is not un-
usual for an issuer to have two kinds of common stock outstanding,
voting and non-voting. In view of their market relationship, trading
in one and out of the other may be tantamount to a purchase and sale
of the same security under Section 16 (b).
Suppose convertible preferred is sold and rights to buy common
are acquired. It is arguable that both transactions involve rights and
hence are securities of the same class. These transactions might also
be considered, in some contexts, as in effect a sale and purchase of
common. In the usual case the market for the convertible security
would vary with that of the common in a fixed ratio and hence no
great difficulty would be presented in computing short term profits
derived from such transactions. A related case appears when stock
is sold and matched by a purchase of warrants or subscription rights
62. INT. REV. REG. III, § 29.22 (9)-I (1943). The amendment is contained in T.
D. 55o7, April 12, 1946.
63. Smolowe v. Delendo, 136 F. (2d) 231 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943), cert, denied, 32o
U. S. 751 (943), cited note 53 supra.
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for the same stock. If the two transactions appear to be associated
as part of a profit making device it is likely that a court will hold them
to be of the same class for purposes of Section 16 (b). In reaching
this conclusion we take notice, of course, of the argument that no profit
actually accrues in this case prior to the exercise of the right.
Suppose (i) there is a sale of options and an acquisition of sub-
scription rights covering the same class of stock; or (2) a sale of
warrants matchable against an installment contract to purchase the
stock. The transactions in both (i) and (2) in our opinion are so
essentially the same as to be treated as the same class. A question
whether the receipt of the option is to be considered a "purchase" is
raised in the case of warrants or subscription rights issued periodically
pursuant to a company-wide employees incentive plan. In order to
avoid the reach of the Act it would have to be concluded that such
an acquisition was not one which could be susceptible to short-swing
abuses by insiders. Such plans are usually for the avowed purpose
of increasing management's investment, rather than for speculation;
hence the view that insiders should be permitted to utilize such rights
to make a short-term profit would be contrary to the spirit of such a
plan. A cognate case is involved in the issuance of bonus stock to a
large number of employees under a fixed bonus plan. Unless riggable
for the purposes of evading Section 16 (b) there would be practical
arguments in favor of concluding that the acquisition of bonus stock
under a general plan should not be treated as a "purchase" under the
statute. In the case of rights received as a bonus or for incentive
purposes the insider obtains greater leverage and control of the timing
of the transactions and hence there is more likelihood of abuse. Where
the bonus is not pursuant to an established bonus plan it would
appear to be more amenable to use as an evasion device. Therefore,
we believe that in such a case the acquisition of bonus stock would
more likely be held to be a "purchase" matchable against any sale of that
class of stock within six months. Furthermore, any sale of such bonus
stock would be matchable for Section i6 (b) purposes against any
purchase of the same class of stock within six months of such sale.
Whether a transaction is to be excepted as an acquisition in con-
nection with an antecedent debt is essentially a question of fact as to
the bona fides of the transaction. If it was not clearly necessary to
take stock in payment, then we believe the courts will hold -it not
within the exception contained in Section 16 (b). If the debt were
created under circumstances indicating that it was for the purposes of
evading the statute, we believe the acquisition should be held not in
"good faith."
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Suppose one transaction occurred before any equity security of
the issuer was registered on an exchange. In our opinion if the last
of the two transactions in question occurred after the registration of
an equity security, then the profit would have been realized subject
to the statute. A contrary ruling would permit realization of a profit
from use of inside information with respect to a company which is
within the class dealt with by the statute. A problem is also presented
where the only security whichhas been registered is withdrawn from
registration 64 after one of the two transactions. A literal reading of
the statute would indicate that this case is not within the statute which
requires that the profit be realized from a purchase and sale of an
equity security of an issuer which has an equity security registered on
an exchange. However, it can be argued persuasively that the section
should apply because the insider could have taken advantage of con-
fidential information by effecting one transaction while the issuer was
registered by purchase or sale and effecting the matching transaction
after delisting, all within six months.
An associated question arises when a director or officer is not
such at the time of both the purchase and sale. The fact that the.
statute expressly requires a beneficial owner to be such at both times
argues for the conclusion that it is not necessary for the director or
officer to'be such at both times. It seems clear that if he is a director
at either time, he could have made use of inside information to obtain
a profit for himself. The statute refers to profits realized by "him,"
meaning the insider. It is possible to argue that this language was
intended to require that the director be such at the time of the transac-
tion when the profit was realized. However, the word "him" as used
in the statute may be construed as not necessarily signifying that he
must be a director at the time when the profit was actually realized,
but that it will suffice if he was such at the time when either of the
transactions took place. This view is supported by the provision in
Section 16 that the insider need not intend to reverse ihe transaction
within six months.
Suppose the trading is done by a partnership or corporation of
which a partner or controlling person is an insider with respect to the
security bought and sold. In the partnership case it would seem that
the partner-insider has a beneficial interest in the purchase and must
report such ownership under Section 16 (a); and also must account for
any profits from a sale thereof within six months. The problem of re-
porting the trading by a holding company in securities of an issuer of
64. Such withdrawal requires filing of an application with the Commission and
compliance with terms imposed by the Commission in the interest of investors (§ 12(d),
Rule X-12D2-I).
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which a controlling person of the holding company is an officer or
director is dealt with in a Commission Release. 6- This rule may be
briefly summed up by the statement that Section i6 (b) liability cannot
be avoided by acting through what is in effect a holding company, the
function of which is substantially to trade in behalf of said insider and
those associated with him. It is of course a question of fact in each
case as to the nature and purpose of the company. Special problems
arising from distributing and underwriting transactions are dealt with
in exemption rules adopted by the Commission. Because of their very
specialized character we do no more at this point than refer the reader
to Rule X-I6B-2 and X-16C-2.
Fixing the time of the purchase or sale is important both to deter-
mine whether the short-term period was exceeded and to determine
the prices to be used in computation of profits. In the case of an
ordinary purchase through a broker, the time and price reported on
the confirmation would ordinarily fix the rights of the parties and
would seem the appropriate date for Section 16 (b) purposes.6
Suppose the purchase is on an installment contract binding on both
parties, and the purchaser can obtain delivery of a portion or all of
the stock at any time by making appropriate payment. Under this
type of contract it is our view that absent special provisions impelling
a different result, the contract date would start the six months period,
both for later sales and those prior to the contract, and the purchase
price would be that fixed in the contract.
A new type of installment contract has been evolved recently,
presumably to avoid the latest treasury regulation governing options.
The contract is a bifurcated affair. It contains provisions under which
the purchaser has the right to rilake payments on account from time
to time and to have equivalent shares set aside for him, delivery to be
made only upon completion of all of the payments, and in the event of
failure to complete the purchase, the payments made are to be retained
by the company as liquidated damages. However, the larger payments
are deferred to the latter part of the contract term, and the purchaser
could escape any serious loss, if he decides not to complete the con-
tract. As we analyze this type of installment contract it is similar in
many respects to the acquisition of an option; however, in other re-
spects it more closely resembles an acquisition of the underlying securi-
ties within the meaning of Section 16.67 The important question in-
65. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 1965 (1938). This release also discusses
application of § i6 (a) to the partnership and related problems arising in trust situa-
tions.
66. Cf. Rule X-i5Ci-i.
67. As noted above, "purchase" by definition includes a contract to purchase or
otherwise acquire and it has been held that this includes such executed acquisitions as
conversions of preferred to common. See note 58 supra.
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volves fixing of the date when the acquisitions take place in order to
determine whether other sales that may be matched with such ac-
quisitions have resulted in a realized profit under Section 16. If the
contract can be viewed as substantially the same as the grant of an
option it would seem that it ought to be treated as such, and hence,
the acquisition of the definitive security does not take place until the
take-down. But assuming that the "contract" cannot be considered
as an option because it is more like a "purchase," it is necessary to
consider whether the date of acquisition should be the contract date
or the date of actual delivery of the securities or any part thereof. In
the case of a sale of the definitive security prior to the installment con-
tract it appears to us that the contract date should be the significant
date. Otherwise it would be a relatively simple matter to trade on
inside information by selling from portfolio and effectually reacquiring
the stock by obtaining such a "contract."
In respect to a sale of the definitive security subsequent to the
subscription contract date we believe a court could justifiably hold that
any sale within six months of either the contract date or any take-
down date would come within the statute. Moreover, if several trans-
actions are involved, such as a sale on November i, followed by pur-
chase contract on January i, take-down on April i and sale on August
i, we believe that the courts would compute the profits so as not to
require the insider to pay to the issuer any sum greater than his actual
profits attributable to the purchase contract and the aforesaid related
transactions. Of course, each such case would have to be determined
on the provisions of the particular contract, the relationship of the
insider to the corporation, and the kind of trading carried on by the
insider. If the nature of the installment contract was such as to
present no likelihood of misuse to defeat the purposes of the statute,
the court no doubt would construe an ambiguous contract in a way
that would take the transaction thereunder outside of the statute.
A question arises when securities acquired by a partnership are
distributed to the partners and they then sell. Is the date of acquisition
the time when the firm buys or when the individual partner gets the
security? The partner-insider would have to report the acquisition
when the firm bought the security. That would ordinarily be the date
when the six months period begins to run. However, if it appears
that this technique is employed in a context indicating evasion of the
statute, we believe the courts could construe it otherwise.
Calculation of the amount of the profits is relatively simple in the
ordinary purchase and sale case. As in the tax field, expenses prop-
erly attributable to the transactions should be allowed, so that the
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prices used would b net to the insider. Problems of cost determina-
tion arise in option and conversion cases. Should the acquisition cost
of the option warrant enter into the calculation? Suppose the warrant
was received for past services or other valid consideration. We be-
lieve a court would allow such cost of the option if bona fide. If the
options are only for incentive and definitely not compensatory it would
seem no cost would be assigned to them in calculating profits.
The transferable option is itself an equity security subject to Sec-
tion 16 (b), and profits from its acquisition and sale within six months
inure to the corporation for there is often a going market for option
warrants or similar rights. Nevertheless we do not believe that the
value of the option can be considered in computing the profit realized
from the exercise of the option and immediate sale of the stock. Since
the option may -be sold for approximately the difference between the
exercise price and the market price of the stock, allowing this "worth"
as part of the cost of the stock would leave no profit. Accepting the
latter hypothesis would open a huge loophole in the section. How-
ever, the legislative history makes it 'clear that insider abuses effectuated
through the option device was one of the very evils Congress sought
to remedy. As the House Report emphasized: "The granting of
options to pools and syndicates has been found to be at the bottom of
most manipulative operations, because the granting of these options
permits large-scale manipulations to be conducted with a minimum
of financial risk to the manipulators." 68 In our view the provisions
of Section 16 (b) and its legislative history will support a determina-
tion that the "value" of the option (that is to say the difference be-
tween the market price of the security and the exercise price) will not
be allowed in the computation of Section 16 (b) profits. A contrary
holding, in our opinion, would defeat the remedial purposes of the
statute.
In our opinion short-term profit from an acquisition of an option
and disposition of it by exercise is not recoverable under Section 16 (b)
absent other transactions. The disposition (by exercise) in the or-
dinary case would not be a sale of the option, since the option is not
the consideration for the security received; the option is merely a token
of the privilege to choose the time of purchase. To be sure, the exer-
cise of the option is a purchase of the security received, at the exercise
price, but if that purchase is not matchable against a sale within six
months thereof, there would appear to be no profit under Section 16
(b). We would take a contrary position if instead of exercising the
68. H. R. REP. 1383, 7 3d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) IO-iI ; see also Sa. REP. 1435, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 55-63. Compare Rule X-16B-3, which reflects the Commission's
view that exercise of options would result in § 16 (b) liability.
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option, it is sold within six months in the open market at a profit or
exchanged with the issuer for a more favorable option. In the Park &
Tilford case 69 which involved the conversion of preferred stock into
common, the court held that "Under'the statute the amount recover-
able by plaintiff is the receipts from the sale of the stock, minus the
purchase price. The common stock in question here was purchased by
exchanging preferred for it. Its purchase price was therefore the market
value of the preferred on the conversion date."
The convertible security is obviously composed of a security plus
an option. Whether the convertible security is to be considered on
the same or a similar basis as an option for profit computation pur-
poses depends on its essential characteristics. If it is basically an
option its value should not be included in the cost of the security re-
ceived, except to the extent that any material value can be assigned-to
the security converted. On the contrary, if it is inherently a security,
the option to convert being only incidental thereto, the market value of
the convertible security would probably be held to be the exchange
equivalent for the security received on conversion.
RULE MAKING POWER AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
(a) Rule Making Power
Administrative rules may be roughly classified as procedural or
substantive. 7° Although the Commission has found it necessary to
adopt a complete set of rules of practice to govern actions commenced
before it as an administrative tribunal, these rules generally have no
effect upon Section I6, for that section is enforceable only in the district
courts of the United States.7°a Substantive rules, adopted under the
Act, pursuant to. Sections 3 (b), 16 (b), I6 (d), and 23 (a) of the
Act, however, are applicable to Section I6. Section 3 (b) provides
that the Commission may "define technical, trade, and accounting terms
used" in the Act so long as they are not inconsistent with any of its
provisions. This permits the Commission to cast its interpretation of
the statute into the form of definitions of the words used. Under it, the
Commission has defined such words as "listed," 71 "officer," 72 and
"short sale." 73
69. Discussed supra at p. 483.
7o. Another classification, interpretative rules, may more properly be considered
substantive. See Blair-Smith, Forms of Administrative Interpretation Ududer the Secit-
rities Laws (1941) 26 IowA L. REv. 241.
7oa. Confidential treatment of § 16 (a) filings are, however, affected by S. E. C.
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Section i6 (b) grants to the Commission the right to exempt
from that subsection any transactions which may not be comprehended
within its purpose. This is very plainly a power to regulate substantive
rights. However, it is limited by the requirement that no exemption
be granted unless it conforms to the purpose of Congress as expressed
in the Act. Accordingly, the power has been utilized sparingly. Thus
far, the rule-making power granted by this subsection has been utilized
to exempt transactions in certain enumerated types of securities, trans-
actions originated prior to October I, 1934, or in the case of employee
options, prior to June 6, 1934, transactions by public utility holding
companies and their 'subsidiaries, and certain distributing and under-
writing transactions.?s The Commission concluded that these trans-
actions were not within the intent of Congress, and so it was deemed
desirable to exempt them from the liability imposed by Section I6 (b).
Section I6 (d) broadly delegates to the Commission the power
to make "such rules and regulations as the Commission may adopt in
order to carry out the purposes of this Section." It is a corollary to
the Section 16 (b) rule making authority. Both grants of power are
restricted by the purposes of the section, which are defined generally
in Section 2 and more specifically in the first clause of Section I6 (b).
Taken together, they -delegate to the Commission the power to exempt
transactions not comprehended with the purposes of the Congress and
to adopt whatever rules are necessary to assure that all transactions
properly within the area prescribed by Congress are subjected to the
liabilities of the Section. 7
4
Finally, Section 23 (a) grants to the Commission the "power to
make such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the execution
of the functions vested in [the Commission] by this title." This has
no specific reference to Section 16 of the Act, but applies to all of the
provisions of the Act, and delegates a broad power to issue any rule
or regulation the Commission deems necessary to protect the interests
of investors.
Considerable latitude is provided by these sections for the exercise
of administrative discretion. In a field as technical as that covered by
the Securities Exchange Act a broad discretion is essential if the Act
73a. See Rules X-12F-4, X-16B-i, X-16B-3, X-16B-4 and X-16B-2. Under this
last Rule, underwriters affiliated in any way with the issuer are exempted from the lia-
bility imposed by § I6 only if other persons, who are not affiliated with the issuer,
"participate in the purchase . . . on terms at least as favorable as those" of the
affiliated underwriter "and to an extent at least equal to the aggregate participation"
of the affiliated underwriter. See also Rule X-16C-2 with respect to short sales.
74. The only rule thus far adopted under § I6 (d) is Rule X-I6D-i, which makes
it unlawful for any officer or director of an issuer of an equity security registered on
an exchange to engage in an arbitrage in any equity security of that issuer, whether
registered or not and renders any such arbitrage subject to §§ I6 (a), 16 (b) of the
Act.
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is to be workable. It would be impossible to "define the whole gamut
of remedies . . . in an infinite variety of situations. Congress met
these difficulties by leaving the adoption of means to end to the empiric
process of administration." 75 The rules promulgated pursuant to the
statutory mandate are then enforced by the courts as if the were a
part of the statute itself.
76
(b) Constitutionality
The Securities Exchange Act was passed to cure evils disclosed
in an extensive investigation of stock exchange practices conducted
by the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency of the 73rd Con-
gress. The record of this investigation and the report of the Com-
mittee are replete with instances of the misuse of information by cor-
porate insiders for their personal profit in security transactions. The
reports of the Senate and House Committees which considered the
proposed legislation demonstrate, by their frequent reference to such
misuse of inside information, the part which abuse of corporate position
played in preventing honest markets and in destroying investor con-
fidence in the stock markets and in the companies whose securities were
traded on such exchanges.
As a result of the investigation Congress made a finding, which
it incorporated in Section 2 of the Act, that it was necessary in the
public interest to regulate and control not only stock exchanges and
transactions in securities commonly conducted upon such exchanges
but also practices and matters related thereto, "including transactions
by officers, directors, and principal security holders." Section 16 (b)
is one of the measures adopted by the Act to effectuate this regulation
and control.
It is no longer open to question either that stock exchanges are
proper subjects for federal iegulation 77 or that Congress may impose
whatever requirements it deems in: the public interest to regulate prac-
tices in connection with such subjects.7" The constitutionality of
Section 16 (b) has been attacked chiefly on the ground that its specific
provisions do not provide the safeguards necessary to a proper exer-
cise of the Congressional power. It is contended that the insider, by
being compelled to disgorge his profits regardless of whether it can
75. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Labor Board, 313 U. S. 177, 194 (1941).
76. Arent v. United States, 266 U. S. 127 (1924); cf. Manhattan G. E. Co. v.
Commissioner, 297 U. S. 127 (1936).
77. Currin v. Wallace, 3o6 U. S. I (1939) ; Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S.
I (1923).
78. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 1IO
F. (2d) 117 (App. D. C. 1940); Wright v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 112
F. (2d) 89 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940); R. J. Koeppe & Co. v. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, 95 F. (2d) 550 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938).
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be proved he took unfair advantage of his position, is deprived of his
property without due process of law; and that the statute improperly
delegates legislative authority to the Commission.
In the cases which have ruled on these questions 79 both conten-
tions were rejected. In the leading case on the subject, Smolowe v.
Delendo Corp., involved a suit by stockholders of the Delendo Cor-
poration against persons who were officers, directors, and 12 percent
stockhollers in the corporation to recover the profits they made as a
result of trading in Delendo Corporation securities during a time when
negotiations were in progress for the sale of the corporation's assets.
In holding Section 16 (b) constitutional the Court indicated that
the rule of thumb providing for the recapture of profits did not infringe
the due process guarantees. It was the tendency to evil which the
statute was designed to overcome, and in doing so the Act would
necessarily catch bona fide transactions. This, however, did not render
the provision unconstitutional. Although the Court did not feel com-
pelled to rule upon the constitutionality of the delegation of authority
to the Commission to grant exemptions because no regulation in-
jurious to the defendants had been promulgated by the Commission it
indicated that an adequate standard had in fact been prescribed to
guide the Commission. °
Another argument which may be met is that, assuming Section
16 (b) is constitutional as applied to directors or officers of a cor-
poration the same reasoning would not apply to holders of a ten percent
interest because the latter do not have access to the secret information
the threat of misuse of which furnished the basis for the statute. How-
ever, as a result of its investigation Congress found that principal
security holders, as well as officers and directors, had access to and
misused information which came to their attention by virtue of their
control over the corporation, and incorporated this finding in Section 2
of the Act. It is reasonable to suppose that management would be
responsive to a principal stock interest, and would take no important
action without consulting it. Accordingly, such a stock interest bears
a responsibility at least equal to that of management.8 '
Facilitation of administration makes it reasonable to set a specific
quantum of ownership which will include the great majority of those
who dominate a corporation without at the same time reaching those
79. Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, - F. (2d) - (C. C. A. 2d, 1947); Smolowe
v. Delendo Corp., 136 F. (2d) 231 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943) ; Kogan v. Schulte, 61 F. (2d)
604 (S. D. N. Y. i945).
So. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F. (2d) 231, 240 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
Si. See Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Schulte, cited supra note 58; Southern Pacific Co.
v. Bogert, 250 U. S. 483 (i919), in which majority stockholders were held fiduciaries
for the minority.
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who would be apt to have practically no share in management or in
access to inside information. In the first bill introduced, this figure
was set at five percent.8 2  It was revised upward until, as finally
enacted, the Act required a ten percent interest. Ownership of ten
percent of any class of equity security, Congress found, vested sufficient
control of a publicly held corporation in a person to permit him to
participate with management in the direction of the enterprise and to
receive news of all important actions contemplated by the corporation.
This finding is sufficient to support the reasonableness of the criterion
so long as the activity regulated or prohibited is within the reach of
the federal power, and it appears clear that it is.8" It is unnecessary
that there be a judicial finding on the subject.8 4
UNREGISTERED SECURITIES
Thus far we have considered trading which for the most part
takes place on securities exchanges, for Section 16 is restricted to
securities of issuers which have an equity security "registered on a
national securities exchange." 8' A much larger area for the unfair
use of information obtained by reason of the relationship between the
insider and the corporation exists in the large number of organizations
whose securities are traded on the over-the-counter market. Some
corporate, managers prefer not to have the corporation's securities
listed on an exchange in order to avoid the limitations on and the
publicity attending insider trading." In one case the corporate in-
siders, while they were seeking permission from the Commission to
delist, were engaged in the purchase at 90 of the 7 percent preferred
stock of their company which had a call price of 12o, and shortly
after the delisting was effected the company actually called the stock.8
7
Although the rule of thumb which imposes upon insiders who
trade in registered securities an absolute liability for the profits made
as a result of purchases and sales within six months of each other is
inapplicable to transactions in securities of issuers which do not have
an equity security listed on an exchange, a liability in addition to that
82. S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) ; H. R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
83. United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 120-121 (1941).
84. The American Power and Light Company v. Securities and Exchange Com-"
mission, 67 U. S. 133 (1946) ; U. S. v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144 (1938)
South Carolina Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177 (1938).
85. § 16 (a). Of course, trading in any equity security of such an issuer, whether
on the exchange or not and whether the security traded in is registered, is subject to
§ 16, and most of such trading takes place on exchanges.
86. In the Matter of Joslyn Manufacturing and Supply Co., xo S. E. C. DEcIsIONs
AND REPORTS 311 (Dec., 194).
87. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3315 (1942).
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imposed by the common law may exist by virtue of Section IO (b)
and 29 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act. s8
Section IO (b) makes it unlawful "to use or employ, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange, or any security not so registered, any manipulative
or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 89
Pursuant to the authority granted by this section the Commission
in 1942 promulgated a rule, numbered X-IoB-5, which makes it un-
lawful by use of the federal facilities (i) to engage in any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud, or (2) make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omission to state a material fact, or (3) perform any
act, practice, or course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit
upon any person, in connection with any purchase or sale of any se-
curity. Although an insider may not be liable for profits which result
from all transactions in his corporation's securities, it is probable that
such purchases made on the basis of material inside information not
made available to stockholders will be held in violation of the above-
mentioned rule by reason of his failure to disclose. In view of the
strongly indicated legislative intent to reach abuses of insider posi-
tion 90 it seems reasonable to forecast that the courts will construe the
rule to effectuate that purpose. However, the difficulties in such a
case would be underscored when the trading is done on an organized
exchange, because it is impersonal in character, and it may be impos-
sible to establish privity.
These unlawful acts may be the subject of either injunctive action
at the suit of the Commission 91 or criminal action.9 2  Recently, it has
been held that there is also a private right of action to recover damage
deriving from a violation of Rule X-IoB-5 on the theory that members
of a class for whose protection a statutory duty is created may sue for
injuries resulting from its breach. 93 This doctrine has been firmly
88. Of course, §§ iO (b) and 29 (b) apply also to transactions subject to § 16 lia-
bilities. Fry v. American Cone and Pretzel Co., - F. Supp. - (E. D. Pa. 1947).
89. 48 STAT. 891 (1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 78j (b).
go. See H. R. REP. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), where it was said: "The
causes of dangerous speculation in the securities markets . . . include exploitation
of [investor] . . . ignorance by self-perpetuating management in possession of
inside information."
91. §21 (e).
92. §§ 2r (e) and 32 (a).
93. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., - F. Supp. - (E. D. Pa. 1946) ; Fifth-
Third Union Trust Co. v. Bloch, Civil Action No. 1507 (Unreported, S. D. Ohio
1946) ; Slavin v. Germantown Fire Ins. Co., Civil Action No. 6564 (Unreported, E. D.
Pa. 1946). For a contrary view see Note, SEC Action Against Fraudulent Purchasers
of Securities (1946) 59 HARV. L. REV. 769.
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established in the federal courts, whether the statute involved is an
enactment of the state legislature or of the federal Congress.94 How-
ever, the essential question in each case is the intent of the legislature to
confer or withhold such relief. Ordinarily intent to give such a remedy
will be found unless there is clear indication to the contrary. In fact,
it has been applied to an action instituted by certain investors against
the New York Stock Exchange for damages resulting from the failure
of the exchange to enforce a rule adopted pursuant to Section 6 (b)
of the Securities Exchange Act.9 5
Section 29 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act, which invalidates
contracts made in violation of the Act, would also furnish the basis
for such an action in cases where a contract is involved performance
of which or the making of which involves a violation of the Act. Under
Section 29 (b) suit might properly lie for rescission, or if that remedy
is unavailable, for such other relief as will prevent the defendant from
profiting from his unlawful act.96
EFFECTS OF SECTION 16
There has been no significant disagreement with the underlying
purpose of Section 16 since the Act was passed.97 The Act itself was
the culmination of a long series of investigations by governmental and
private committees and was aimed at correcting the abuses which
those investigations disclosed, among which trading by insiders in
order to take unfair advantage of information possessed by them in
their official capacity loomed large.98 While concededly the prophy-
laxis prescribed by Congress to remedy these abuses was not expected
to completely banish them, we think that it has been reasonably
effective in achieving its purpose. In twelve years the Commission
has had to resort to the courts in only one case to enforce the reporting
requirements of Section 16 (a) 99 and there have been only a handful
of private suits to recover Section 16 (b) liabilities. In a relatively
94. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 3940 (1916); Zajkowaski v.
American Steel & Wire Co., 258 Fed. 9 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918) ; Armour v. Wanamaker,
202 Fed. 423 (C. C A. 3d, 1913) ; Narramore v. Cleveland C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co.,
96 Fed. 298, 300-3OI (C. C. A. 6th, 1899) ; Donaldson v. Tuscon Gas, Electric Light &
Power Co., 14 F. Supp. 246, 247-248 (D. Ariz. 1935) ; see also Abonnader v. Stroh-
meyer & Arpe Co., 243 N. Y. 458, 154 N. E. 309 (1926).
95. Baird v. Franklin, 141 F. (2d) 238 (C. C. A. 2d, 1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S.
737 (1944).
96. Cf. Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U. S. 282 (1940).
97. See Hearings Before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on
H. R. 4344, H. R. 5o65, H. R. 5832, 77th Cong., ist Sess. (94I) 1247.
98. For a brief history of stock market regulation in this country see Tracy and
MacChesney, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (I934) 32 MicH. L. Rav. 1025,
1033-1o36.
99. Securities and Exchange Commission v. L. A. Young, Civil Action No. 4154
(E. D. Mich. 1945).
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small number of instances the Commission has found it necessary to
require disclosures in proxy statements, registration statements and
annual reports of information respecting short-term trading by manage-
ment. 100 Not infrequently when indicated liability under Section 16
(b) is called to the attention of the insider payment has been made to
the issuer, possibly because insiders prefer to pay rather than disclose
their trading profits directly to the stockholders. We understand the
volume of trading by executives of public utility holding companies
and railroad companies in the securities of these companies has been
small, probably because they are more sophisticated than management
generally in terms of regulatory statutes.' 0 ' Moreover, the manage-
ment of public utility companies faces the possibility of being limited
to cost plus interest in any trading conducted by them during the
pendency of reorganization procedures, pursuant to Section ii of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act.
10 2
Probably there has been a substantial amount of trading in securi-
ties of other companies on the basis of information given them by
their opposite numbers in those companies, and vice versa. Although
we assume that a certain amount of this corporate log-rolling is in-
evitable, the incentives are not nearly as great and difficulties inherent
in the process will tend to make it much less a source of abuse, than if
the door were wide open to speculation by corporation executives in
securities of the corporation. Trading through friends or relatives
involves, of course, the risk of Section 16 (b) suits which together with
the lesser incentives involved in trading through others are limiting
factors on such trading. On the whole we think it fair to assume that
the legislative prescription has substantially accomplished the results
intended, viz., to curb speculation by insiders on the basis of corporate
information which, as a prominent stock exchange representative once
stated in his testimony, they would be less than human not to be sorely
tempted to do.' 03
IOO. The proxy rules require disclosure in proxy statements of stipulated informa-
tion respecting the indebtedness of certain officers, directors who served the previous
year, and directors listed for election. Section 16 (b) liabilities are includable in this
item. The Commission merely requires a statement of the facts and the possibility of
liability, and permits statements that in the opinion of the management there is no lia-
bility. Schedule I4A, Item 5 (I) (4). In certain cases disclosures as to options, bonus
securities, etc., becomes pertinent to registration statements filed in connection with
security offerings (Form S-i) under the Securities Act of 1933, and also in some in-
stances such information is pertinent to annual reports (Form Io-K) filed pursuant to
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
ioi. It is to be noted that the Holding Company Act (§ 17) does not include
io% beneficial owners, but only directors, and officers, in the class which must report,
and are subject to liability in respect of, their trading in company securities. For com-
parison with the coverage of § 30 (f) of the Investment Company Act see Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 2687 (1940).
102. S. E. C. v. Chenery Corporation, 318 U. S. 8o (1943). A second appeal is
awaiting decision in the Supreme Court.
103. See note 97 supra.
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Any -discussion of the merits of Section 16 (b) must be in the
frame of reference of this basic human factor. Trading by manage-
ment, considered unobjectionable in the smaller family type corpora-
tions, was carried over into the large publicly owned companies. Such
activities by management create a duality of interest in the corporate
executive which has been recognized by all as an evil which must be
eradicated. It is this conflict of interest, the pull of contending in-
fluences and temptations which make speculative insider trading in-
herently wrong. It is horn-book law that a fiduciary cannot serve
two, masters. Accordingly, in considering the arguments against the
statute which have been advanced by the securities industry it is
important to keep in mind that the activities constrained-however
beneficial they might or might not be in respect to the securities mar-
kets-contravene basic equitable principles, uniformly and rigidly
enforced by courts of chancery.104
Suggestions for the amendment of Section 16 have heretofore
been made by representatives of the securities industry,10 who are
understandably interested in greater trading for the commissions and
profits involved. The stock exchanges, brokers and investment bankers
have sought to extend the provisions of Section 16 (a) and Section
I6 (c) to include many of the large corporations now exempt from
those requirements.10 6 However, in the past they have indicated a
desire to restrict the application of Section 16 (b), or to repeal it
outright.
An argument advanced against Section 16 (b) is that the Act
is not a completely effective deterrent to insider speculation. That is
conceded. But we believe it does go a long way toward remedying
the worst aspects of the practice. Although considerable trading in
their own corporations' securities is still done by insiders the dearth
of claims under Section 16 (b) indicates that relatively little of this is
for the purpose of short swing speculative profits, particularly in view
of the comparatively simple process for recovery of such profits. In-
deed, even if it be assumed arguendo that there is considerable evasion,
that would not justify removing the restraints imposed by Congress,
any more than it would be proper to repeal the anti-smuggling laws,
if there were indications of widespread evasions or violations of such
laws.
io4. Woods v. City National Bank and Trust Co., 312 U. S. 262, 268-9 (1941);
American United Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. City of Avon Park, 311 U. S. 138, 147
(i94o) ; Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 164 N. E. 545 (1928).
io5. See note 97 supra.
io6. A similar proposal was made by the Commission in a report to Congress en-
titled: A Proposal to Safeguard Investors in Unregistered Securities (1946), which
was introduced near the end of the 79th Cong. as H. R. 715-.
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Nor does it appear that publicity alone would be an adequate
deterrent to such short-swing profits. The reports filed under Section
16 (a) receive only limited publicity, and often public dissemination
of their contents is delayed.
107
Let us assume that the publicity provisions of Section 16 are
broadened to an extent" which would assure that the proper informa-
tion is brought home to the individual stockholders. It is nevertheless
difficult to see how the individual stockholder can effectively correlate
information as to trading with developments in the affairs of the cor-
poration in order to ferret out misuse of inside information. In view
of the practical difficulties both with respect to getting the necessary
data and in doing anything about it which would constitute a real
threat to management, it is dubious indeed whether the remote pos-
sibility thereof would amount to much of a deterrent to management.
Any assertion of impropriety is easily denied by the strongly en-
trenched insider. Moreover, proxy fights are expensive and rarely
successful. Past experience, too, indicates that publicity alone is an
ineffective sanction, for the disclosure provisions of the Securities Act
of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were not enough
to stop the malpractices in the investment field. Congress was finally
compelled to meet this problem by regulatory legislation, enacting the
Investment Company Act of 1940308
It has been contended also that speculative trading by insiders
is desirable because it retards undue declines and rises in the market
and otherwise broadens the market. This argument appears to be
inconsistent with the claim that the statute has not had the intended
deterrent effect. Moreover, that such a stabilizing effect results from
insider trading is doubtful. The volume of such trading, although
involving a substantial number of shares, is relatively insignificant in
view of the exceedingly small percentage of the .total volume which
such trading represents, we are informed. Moreover, evidence is lack-
ing that management would to any substantial degree unselfishly
commit large amounts of personal funds to bolster the market because
of their desire to benefit the company or its public stockholders. This
io7. The reports are filed within IO days after the close of the calendar month in
which the trading occurred. Then, time is required to compile and publicize their
contents. The stock exchanges have taken steps to release this information through
the broid tape as promptly as possible.
1o8. 54 STAT. 789 (1940), 15 U. S. C. § 8oa-i et seq. The report of the House
Committee on this bill itself stated:
"The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 have
not acted as deterrents to the continuous occurrence of abuses in the organization
and operation of investment companies. Generally, these acts provide only for
publicity. The record is clear that publicity alone is insufficient to eliminate mal-
practices in investment companies." H. R. REP. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940)
244-
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is consonant with management's position; its function is to manage
the company, not the stock market.
It seems to us that there are powerful economic forces which
determine the breadth of the market and that the huge number of
shares outstanding in the case of the large-publicly owned companies,
in which management usually has a very small personal stock interest,
makes it highly improbable that trading by management will have a
significant effect in preventing attenuation of the market. Moreover,
the fundamental vice in encouraging speculative trading by manage-
ment as a bolster to the securities markets is the resultant creation of
inevitable and pervasive conflicts of interest which contravene basic
principles of law and ethics.
It is no answer to assert that management generally will not trade
on inside information. As was so realistically and candidly conceded
by the representative of industry in the hearings in connection with
a bill to amend the Securities Exchange Act, an insider would be less
than human were he not tempted by such information, and it is just
such temptations that the law in the same or similar contexts has
rigidly guarded against. The Supreme Court recently reiterated in
Woods v. City National Bank and Trust Company 10 9 that it is the
subtle play of conflicting forces, unprovable for the most part in a
specific case,110 which is guarded against by the strictly applied
equitable doctrine that the trustee shall not be permitted to use his
strategic position to profit himself.
In any event, Section 16 (b) does not prevent selfless support of
the market; all it says is that profits on short-swings shall inure to
the company. Finally, we are aware of no instance in which it has
been demonstrated that an insider failed to purchase or sell securities
to cushion a fall or stop a rise in the market because of the responsi-
bility he might incur under Section 16 (b). 11  Moreover, transac-
lO9. 312 U. S. 262, 268 (1941). The court aptly stated: "The principle enunci-
ated by Chief Justice Taft in a case involving a contract to split fees in violation of
the bankruptcy rules, is apposite here: 'What is struck at in the refusal to enforce
contracts of this kind is not only actual evil results but their tendency to evil in other
cases.' Weil v. Neary, 278 U. S. I6o, 173. Furthermore, the incidence of a particu-
lar conflict of interest can seldom be measured with any degree of certainty. The
bankruptcy court need not speculate as to whether the result of the conflict was to delay
action where speed was essential, to close the record of past traneactions where pub-
licity and investigation were needed, to compromise claims by inattention where vigi-
lant assertion was necessary, or otherwise to dilute the undivided loyalty owed to those
whom the claimant purported to represent. Where an actual conflict of interest exists,
no more need be shown in this type of case to support a denial of compensation."
iio. This view of the need for deterrents not dependent on proving a subjective
state of mind is also underscored by the action of Congress in 1938 in enacting § 249
of the BANKRUPTCY AcT. See In re Midland United Company, - F. (2d) - (C. C.
A. 3d, 1947).
iii. In the only specific instance called to the attention of the Commission of an
insider who refrained from supporting the market in his corporation's securities because
UNFAIR USE OF CORPORATE INFORMATION
tions by insiders would frequently involve a period of time in excess
of six months and could be undertaken without running afoul of Sec-
tion 16 (b).
It is also claimed that Section 16 (b) contains an unfair implica-
tion that all insiders are dishonest. At the very least, it is contended,
the section should be amended so that only insiders who cannot prove
the validity of their motives should be liable for short-swing profits.
Of course, such an amendment would lead to protracted and difficult
litigation aimed at determining a state of mind at a particular time.
It would, moreover, create an obstacle to recovery which in the usual
case would be insurmountable because of the limited resources of indi-
vidual security holders. As the Supreme Court said in Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., et al.: "Abuse of corporate
position, influence, and access to information may raise questions so
subtle that the law may deal with them effectively only by prohibitions
unconcerned with the fairness of a particular transaction." 1:12 A strik-
ing analogy is the Banking Act of 1933, to which no dissenting voice
has been raised, which provides in general that a banker should not
engage in underwriting securities because his interest in the success
of the underwriting would frequently conflict with his fiduciary obliga-
tion to trust funds in his care and with his moral obligations to
depositors.'13
Accordingly, both common law and statutory law have imposed
upon fiduciaries an absolute obligation to refrain from representing
conflicting interests or to engage in any activity which creates con-
flicting pressures. Obviously this cannot be considered an imputation
of dishonesty to all fiduciaries. No one would contend that the
Banking Act of 1933 impugns the honesty of bankers or that Section
249 of the Bankruptcy Act does the same with respect to all trustees,
protective committees, etc., in corporate reorganization.
That Section 16 (b) is sound legislation was attested by one of
the leading representatives of the public utility industry of this country
in advocating the extension of all of Section 16 to public utility holding
companies at the time of the hearings on the Public Utility Holding
Company bill. Mr. Wendell Willkie then said:
of the possible effect of his actions upon his § 16 (b) liability it developed that the in-
sider refused to make any purchases long after any possibility of such liability was re-
moved and after the price of the stock had dropped still further. Hearings, supra note
1O3, at pp. 1258-1259.
112. 318 U. S. 80, 92 (1943).
113. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Agnew, 67 S. Ct.
411 (647), in which the Supreme Court said: "Section 32 [of the Banking Act of
1933] is directed to the probability or likelihood, based on the experience of the 192O's
that a bank director interested in the underwriting business may use his influence in
the bank to involve it or its customers in securities which his underwriting house has
in its portfolio or has committed itself to take."
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"There is no question that the provision you gentlemen made
about officers not using inside information for personal profit was
a salutary measure, and was merely a reaffirmation of the trust
obligation which men should have obeyed anyhow." 114
i14. Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on Sen. z725,
74th Cong., ist Sess. (I935) 6oo.
